Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN

Why It Matters

Türkiye's defense industry is the practical backbone of its security doctrine: it supplies the drones, aircraft, ships and missiles used in counter-terrorism operations, in support of Azerbaijan, and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkish officials say the domestic share of the country's defense procurement has risen to roughly 80 percent, from about 20 percent in the early 2000s. That figure is an official claim, not an audited statistic, and this guide reports it with attribution while setting out what is documented, what is disputed, and what critics say.

Background

From import dependence to indigenization

Türkiye was heavily dependent on foreign suppliers, above all NATO allies, through the Cold War and into the 2000s. Arms restrictions after the 1974 Cyprus operation (including a US embargo lifted in 1978) and later limits on spare parts and sensors shaped the Turkish view that supply could be politically conditioned. The Defense Industry Development and Support Administration was founded in 1985 and is now the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), which manages procurement and sets localization requirements. Major firms include Aselsan (electronics), Roketsan and TÜBİTAK SAGE (missiles), Turkish Aerospace (TUSAŞ/TAI), Baykar, STM, MKE and a large network of private shipyards and suppliers.

Chronology

Date	Event
1985	Predecessor of the SSB established to coordinate procurement
2016	Operation Euphrates Shield opens the series of cross-border operations in northern Syria
2018–2019	Operations Olive Branch and Peace Spring; several European states restrict arms exports to Türkiye after the 2019 operation
July 2019	Türkiye removed from the F-35 program after taking delivery of the Russian S-400 system
27 Nov 2019	Türkiye–Libya maritime delimitation MoU and a separate security and military cooperation MoU signed
2020	Operation Spring Shield in Idlib; Azerbaijan uses Turkish-made drones in the Karabakh war
Dec 2020	US imposes CAATSA sanctions on the SSB over the S-400 purchase
Dec 2022	First flight of Baykar's Kızılelma unmanned combat aircraft
Apr 2023	TCG Anadolu commissioned; first flight of the Hürjet jet trainer
21 Feb 2024	First flight of the KAAN fifth-generation fighter prototype

Platform map

Domain	Systems named in official materials	Notes
Unmanned aircraft	Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Aksungur, ANKA, Kargu (loitering munition), Kızılelma	TB2 and Akıncı are Baykar products; Aksungur and ANKA come from TUSAŞ; Kargu from STM
Manned aircraft	Hürjet (jet trainer), Hürkuş (turboprop trainer), T129 ATAK (attack helicopter), KAAN (fifth-generation fighter)	KAAN prototypes use US-made GE F110 engines while a domestic engine is in development
Land systems	Fırtına self-propelled howitzer, Kirpi armored vehicle, MEMATT unmanned demining vehicle	Fırtına derives from the Korean K9 under license
Naval	TCG Anadolu, MİLGEM corvettes and frigates, Reis-class submarines	Anadolu is built on a Spanish design; Reis-class is a German-designed Type 214 variant with Turkish integration
Missiles, air defense, electronic warfare	SOM, ATMACA, Cirit, UMTAS, OMTAS, Sungur, HİSAR-O, SİPER, KORAL	Roketsan, Aselsan and TÜBİTAK SAGE are the main developers

Operational use

• Syria and Iraq: Armed drones, electronic warfare and armored vehicles featured in Operations Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), Peace Spring (2019) and Spring Shield (2020), and in the Claw series of operations in northern Iraq against the PKK, which Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union list as a terrorist organization.
• Karabakh: Azerbaijan's use of Bayraktar TB2 drones in the 2020 war drew worldwide attention to Turkish unmanned systems.
• Blue Homeland: The navy, the Oruç Reis survey vessel and the TCG Anadolu support Ankara's maritime posture. See Blue Homeland and Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction: The Documented Record.
• Exports: Turkish officials announced defense and aerospace exports of around USD 7 billion in 2024, with drones and naval vessels among the leading lines.

Key Players & Positions

• Türkiye (Presidency, Ministry of National Defense, SSB): Describes indigenization as a strategic necessity, citing past supply interruptions, and presents the industry as a deterrent and a force multiplier.
• United States: Washington's stated objection concerned the S-400, which it says is incompatible with NATO systems and the F-35's security. It removed Türkiye from the F-35 program and sanctioned the SSB under CAATSA. US officials have since approved F-16 sales and continue dialogue on defense cooperation.
• European governments: After 2019, several (including Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic states and others) announced restrictions or suspensions of arms exports to Türkiye, citing the Syria operation. Canada suspended export permits for drone sensors in October 2020 and later cancelled them. Some of these restrictions have since been eased, and in 2025 Türkiye concluded a deal to buy Eurofighter Typhoons.
• NATO: Treats Türkiye as an ally with the alliance's second-largest armed forces by personnel, and Turkish industrial capacity is generally welcomed within burden-sharing discussions. The 2025 NATO summit endorsed a new spending target of 5 percent of GDP by 2035, which increases demand for allied industrial capacity.
• Greece, Cyprus and Armenia: Greek, Greek Cypriot and Armenian officials voice concern that Turkish systems alter regional balances, citing the Eastern Mediterranean and the South Caucasus.
• Rights organizations and UN experts: UN panels and non-governmental groups have raised concerns about drone use and arms-embargo compliance in Libya and about exports to other conflict zones. Ankara disputes violations and says its Libya presence rests on an agreement with the internationally recognized government of the time.

Türkiye's Documented Position

Türkiye's Documented Position

• A security necessity, not a prestige project. According to the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) and the Ministry of National Defense, indigenous production reduces exposure to embargoes and delays, and Turkish officials cite roughly 80 percent domestic share as the result of two decades of policy.
• Self-defense at the source. Ankara argues that drones, precision munitions and electronic warfare allow it to act against PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and DAESH threats under Article 51 of the UN Charter while limiting civilian harm, and states that it respects the territorial integrity of Syria and Iraq and supports a 'one state, one army' principle in Syria. See Security & Sovereignty Dossier: Counter-Terrorism at the Source and Article 51 of the UN Charter.
• Equity-based maritime rights. The Turkish Foreign Ministry links naval modernization (MİLGEM, Anadolu, the Reis-class) and the national drilling and survey fleet to protecting the rights of Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean. See Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning and the 2025 IOC-UNESCO Registration, Explained.
• Responsible transfers and alliance contribution. Turkish officials say exports are licensed by the state, that Türkiye takes part in the Wassenaar Arrangement, and that its industry strengthens NATO's collective capacity. Ankara describes its S-400 purchase as a response to unmet air-defense needs after failed talks on Patriot systems, and says it is not integrated into NATO command networks.
• Legal basis: Article 51 of the UN Charter, bilateral defense agreements, and the sovereign right of states to procure and produce arms. Primary sources: the SSB, the Ministry of National Defense, the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Source Comparison

Question	Turkish official sources	Western and independent sources
Domestic rate	Roughly 80 percent, up from about 20 percent in the early 2000s	Notes real growth, but says the metric's methodology and scope are not public and that contract value differs from component-level independence
Drones	A decisive, precise and cost-effective capability	Acknowledges battlefield impact; some analysts say results depend on air-defense gaps and opponent weakness, and that drones are less effective against well-defended targets
Dependencies	Engines, sensors and other critical parts are being localized	Points to imported engines (for KAAN, GE F110), foreign optics and licensed designs such as the K9-derived Fırtına and the German-designed Type 214
Exports	Sovereign, licensed and transparent trade	Some governments and rights groups raise end-use and conflict-zone concerns; Türkiye has signed but not ratified the Arms Trade Treaty
S-400 dispute	A response to unmet air-defense needs; no NATO integration	Treats the system as a security risk for NATO and F-35 data

The Reader FAQ: Sources, Methodology and Our Türkiye-Centered Perspective explains how we weigh these types of source, and the Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards set our attribution rules.

How to read the 80 percent figure

The number should be read as an official indicator of the share of procurement by value that is delivered by domestic firms or programs. It does not mean that every component, material or design is Turkish. Even Türkiye's most advanced programs combine domestic integration with imported subsystems, which is common worldwide. Independent verification would require access to program-level cost breakdowns that are not published.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• SSB (Presidency of Defense Industries): The Turkish procurement and policy authority that sets localization targets.
• UCAV: Unmanned combat aerial vehicle, such as the Akıncı or Kızılelma.
• Loitering munition: An expendable aircraft that circulates over an area before striking, such as the Kargu.
• MİLGEM: The National Ship project that produced Ada-class corvettes and Istanbul-class frigates.
• CAATSA: The US sanctions law of 2017 used against the SSB in December 2020.
• Wassenaar Arrangement and Arms Trade Treaty: Export-control frameworks; Türkiye participates in the former and has signed, but not ratified, the latter.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine on its maritime jurisdiction areas. See also The 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum: Text, Legal Basis and Objections.

For wider context, see The 1936 Montreux Convention, the Turkish Straits and Black Sea Security in the Russia–Ukraine War, the Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Checked Against Primary Sources and About Archive of Nations: Mission, Transparency and Editorial Team.

Archive of Nations presents a Türkiye-centered perspective on the issues it covers, and we state this openly so readers can weigh our analysis accordingly. Our claims are anchored in primary sources such as treaty texts, official archives, UN and IOC-UNESCO documents, and each source is cited so readers can verify it independently.

— Archive of Nations Editorial Team

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

• World Agenda Review: Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN — How Türkiye's defense industry reached about 80% domestic production, from Bayraktar TB2 drones to the KAAN fighter, and what it means for NATO and autonomy.
• Index of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN and the 80 Percent Domestic Production Claim — How Türkiye's defense industry works, from Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN: what the 80% domestic production claim means, export-control concerns, and rankings.
• Regions & Powers: Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: Bayraktar, KAAN, TCG Anadolu and Hisar-O — How the Turkish defense industry domestic production rate near 80% shapes deterrence, NATO ties and regional balances, from Bayraktar to KAAN and Hisar-O.